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This report gives an overview of the ways Member States have promoted the participation b¥ 
employees in profits and enterprise results since  1991, following the adoption of Council 
Recommendation of 27 July 1992 (92/443/EEC). It has been prepared on the basis of the replies 
by the Member States to a questionnaire. 
The consistency of the .fi~dings of the incentive  effe~t of  schemes on profitability is  remarkable. In 
all cases profit-sharing is associated with higher productivity levels no  matter what methods, model 
specification and data are used. Other positive effects of the schemes are on wage flexibility, 
employment and employee involvement. The development of financial participation schemes is 
strongly influenced by government action, in  particular, by the availability of ta.x  incentives. 
The divergency of government policies in  individual  EU-countries must be  seen against a back-
ground of differing traditions and practices concerning financial. participation schemes. Since the 
first PEPPER report in  1991  there have not been any great changes in  the general approach of 
government policy to  PEPPER schem~s in  EU-countries. France and the  UK  have a long tradition 
of encouragement of financial participation. ln Ireland, Netherlands and Finland government 
support for PEPPER appears to  be  increasing.  In  these countries reference is  made to  the need to 
achieve greater employee involvement, improved productivity, competitiveness and wage flexibility 
on labour markets.  Very recently, in  Germany, Spain and Italy, the authorities have made strong 
appeals to  the social partners to  promote these schemes in the course of their negotiation~. In  all 
other Member States, PEPPER has been discussed but official government support has been limited 
or lacking. With the exception of France and the UK, the  legislation in  the  EU countries mainly 
favours share-ownership. A number of countries reported the trend towards privatisation of public 
bodies as a possible vehicle for greater interest in  PEPPER schemes. 
Most legislation on promoting financial  participation schemes in  Member States on PEPPER has to 
do with incentives such as  fiscal or other financial  advantages. The incentives range from  the tax-
free  issue of shares or bonds to employees to ta.x-free amounts on distributed profits. Other 
advantages arc exemption from social insurance contributions. Titesc incentives are provided in 
some countries for both the employer and the employee. In  addition, sometimes employers are 
allowed to deduct the costs of the scheme. In  some cases problems arise with social charges due to 
disputes about whether the benefits should be  regarded as  normal wages subject to  social charges 
or as some other type of remuneration not subject to  these charges. 
There are certain legislative requirements set in  Member States that mainly relate  to  the 
possibilities of eligibility for tax relief. These requirements consist of a minimwn percentage of 
personnel covered by the scheme, eligibility criteria, -retention periods and statutory and trustee 
requirements, etc. 
Recent arguments for enhancing productivity, employment and wage flexibility  3(C  stimulating 
discussions on proposals. Occasionally companies issue shares to  their cmployc'es when. they arc facing  eco~omic and financial problems. Without sufficient information this carries gre:lt risks for 
employees and has led to scepticism on the part of parties concerned.  -. 
Active campaigns on promotion of PEPPER schemes are found  in  France, the UK,  Finland, the 
Netherlands and Ireland. Other countries like Germany and Italy re'fer in  this respect to the  -
responsibilities of the social partners. In  Ireland, a specific National Programme was launched. In 
Austria representative parties have developed a learning programme which. was included in the 
training for works councils and employers. There is at present no exchange of information between 
Member States regularly either on legislation or good practices. 
In the framework of their .respective competence the following ideas for the reinforcement of 
PEPPER could be explored further by Member States, Social partners,  and  in matters of exchange 
of inforn1ation and good practices by  the Commission: 
•  Consider the development of national framework legislation . 
•  Clear the distinction between wages subject to  social charges and the advantages derived 
from  PEPPER schemes. 
•  Enhance the eligibility of categories of beneficiaries to  PEPPER schemes. 
•  Provide for a stimulating dimate. The development of National Institutional Bodies that 
creates systems for promoting PEPPER in  the  national context could be  helpful. 
•  Set up  PEPPER schemes during privatisation of public bodies rhus  getting experience and 
gaining and cre:uing awareness of the  possibilities of these schemes  \'vith  a wider audience. 
•  Integrate  PEPPER schemes into programmes on employee-involvement to  unleash the 
productive power of the workforce and to  improve competitiveness and quality of 
production. 
•  Make an  appeal to  the social partners to promote these schemes during their negotiations, 
and making references to the expected positive effects of the  schemes on productivity, 
wage flexibility, employment and employee involvement. 
•  Avoid irresponsible risks for employees in case of the  issue of shares to employees when 
companies have economic and financial problems. 
•  Tackle the problems with intra-community schemes of subsidiaries in  different national 
circumstances by promoting the exchange of good information about the different rules and 
procedures of PEPPER in  the Member States. 
•  Promote the development of clear and understandable models and  plans· for  introduction of 
schemes that are manageable and  undcrstand:~.ble by management and labour as  to avoid 
the complex and expert character of PEPPER schemes demonstration projects on good pr.tetices and the promotion of the exchange of information 
in workshops and conferences, and other communications. Prefer.1bly, these actions should 
be directed to the social partners. !  INTROOUCTlON 
1.  Scope and Objectives 
Council Recommendation (92/443/EEC) of 27 July  1992 on the promotion of participation by 
employed persons in profits and enterprise results (including equity participation) commits.the 
Commission to prepare a report within four years of  the adoption of the recommendation. This 
report has  been prepared on the basis of the replies by the Member States to a questionnaire on 
possible actions based on the recommendations. 
The Explanatory Memorandum of  the Recommendation of July 1992 contains an extensive 
description of  the context within which the Recommendation was made. In the process of 
preparing this Community instrument of July  1992 the Commission had funded a research project 
with the specific aim of obtaining a good overview of "the state of the art" concerning financial 
participation by employees in the EC. The results of this project were described in the so-called 




The Recommendation of July  1992 was largely based on this report. The Recommendation invited 
the Member States to acknowledge the benefits of a wider-use of schemes to  increase the 
participation of employed persons in profits and enterprise results by me3lls of profit-sharing, 
employee share-ownership or a combination of both, taking into account the responsibilities of 
management and labour, in  accordance with national law and/or practice. The Recommendation 
called upon Member Swes to: 
ensure that legal structures are adequate to allow the introduction of the financial 
participation schemes referred to in  this recommendation; 
consider the possibility of according incentives such as  fiscal  or other financial advantages 
to encourage the introduction of certain schemes; 
encourage the use of such schemes by facilitating the supply of adequate infonnation to all 
relevant parties; 
take account of experience gained in  other Member States when  de~iding on which 
participation schemes to promote; 
ensure that in the context of the laws, regulations and practice possibly existing in the 
Member States the parties concerned have a wide range of options or arrangements 
available, the implementation of which would, when suitable, be the subject ~f 
consultations between employers and employed persOns or their representatives~ 
ensure that this choice can be  made at a level which, taking account of national collective 
1 Publication:  Supplement 3/91  10  Social Europe. bargaining legislation and/or practices, is as close as possible to the employed person and 
the ~nterprise; 
cOntemplate and/or encourage consideration of  the points set out in the Annex of  the 
Recommendation (see Annex II) when new financial participation schemes are being 
prepared or when existing schemes are being reviewed; · 
examine, after a period of  three years following the adoption of  this recommendation, the 
data available at a national level on the development of financial participation by employed 
persons and communicate the results to the Commission; 
enhance management and labour's awareness of  the above matters. 
Finally, the Commission said that it woul:i present a report to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Economic and Social Committee on the application of  the recommendations on the 
basis of  the information supplied to it by the Member States. The questionnaire that was distributed 
to the Member States asked. for developments and any actions in respect of the apove 
recommendations. 
In general, the objective of  this report is to give an overview of the ways Member States have 
developed schemes and performed actions to  promote the participation by employed persons in 
profits and enterprise results since the Council Recommendation adopted in  1992. 
6 2. Overview of sche~es for financial participation by employees 
There is a wide range of  different forms of  employee participation in enterprise results. These can 
be grouped into tWo m8in categories, w~ich may or may not eo-exist and may in ~me  cases 
overlap: profit-sharing, and employee share-ownership2. 
A Profit-sharing 
"Profit-sharing" in. a strict sense implies the sharing of  profits by providers of  both capital and 
labour, by giving· employees, in addition to a fixed wage, a  variable part of  income directly linked 
to profits ·or some other measure of  enterprise results.  · 
Profit-sharing provides employees with a regular bonus paid out of  profits which would normally 
be allocated to Capital but, contrary to traditional bonuses linked to individual performance (e.g. 
piece rates), profit-sharing is a collective scheme applied to all, or a large group of  employees. 
In practice, profit-sharing can take various forms. At the enterprise level, it can provide employees 
with immediate or deferred benefits; it can be paid in cash,  company shares or other securities; or 
it can take the form of  allocation to specific funds invested for the benefit of  employees. At higher 
levels, profit-sharing takes the form of  economy-wide or regional wage-earners' funds. 
Cash-based profit-sharing links employee bonuses directly to some measure of  company 
performance (profits, revenue; value-added, or other), most frequently providing an immediate 
payment. However, it can also be a deferred scheme: e.g. if a certain percentage of profits is 
allocated to company funds which are then invested in the name of employees. A distinction is 
also made between gain-sharing and profit-sharing although both are clearly related; gain-sharing 
typically consists of a group incentive pay system that is geared to productivity, cost reduction or 
other criteria, less comprehensive than profitability. 
Share-based profit-sharing consists of  giving employees, in relation to profits or some other 
me3$0re of company performance, a portion of shares ·of the company where they work. These are 
usually frozen in a fund for a certain period of time before the workers are allowed to dispose of 
them. When shares are subject to a minimum retention period the term "deferred profit-sharing" is 
used. 
B Employee share-ownership 
Employee share-ownership provides for employee participation in enterprise results in an indirect 
way, i.e. on the basis of participation in ownership, either by receiving dividends, or the 
appreciation of  employee-owned capital, or a Combination· of  the two. ~ile  such schemes are not 
2 Sec for more details on the theoretical discussion and empirical research  Tht~ Peppt~r Rep4rt: .Promotion of  Employet~ 
Participation in Profits and  Entt~rprisl! Ruulu in  tht~ Mt~mberStatu  of  the Europea11 Community, by M Uvalic,Supp1ement 
3/91  to  Social Europe, Brussels, 1991 
7 directly related to company profits, they are related to company profitability and so enable.:··:·  ; 
participants to gain from the growth of  company profits. 
.  '  .  .  . 
Employee share~wnership can be both individual and collective. Shares can be in ~e  corit~~;~~;t:: 
where the employee works or elsewhere. However, the draft Recommendation mainly focUSes. on· 
those e~ployee share-ownership schemes set up with the explicit intention of  providing ·e~plo)r~s 
with an additional source of income related to en~rprise results. 
Employee share-ownership can take many different fonns. Typically a portion of  company shares· 
is reserved for employees and offered at privileged terms; or employees arc offered options to buy 
their company's shares after a detcnnined amount of  time, under favourable tax provisions. 
Altcm~tively, an employee benefit trust is set up through Employee Share-Ownership Plans 
(ESOPs), which acquire company stock that is allocated periodically to each employee's ESOP 
account. Workers' or employee buy-outc; of  their companies are a special form of employee 
share-ownership. 
In the literature, the generic term "employee share-ownership" is  frequently used to denote both 
share-based profit-sharing, and employee share-ownership; "profit-sharing" is sometimes used to 
refer to both profit-sharing in the strict sense of profit-related pay, and to share-based 
profit-sharing. The distinction between individual and collective employee share-ownership is also 
not always clear-cut. 
This report refers primarily to those schemes which are:  internal (applied within a company); 
collective (available for all, or a major part of employees); continuous (applied on a regular basis); 
and providing for employee participation in some mea3ure of enterprise performance (whether 
directly or indirectly). 
In summary, the following PEPPER schemes can be distinguished: 
PS:  profit-sharing 
SPS:  share-based profit-sharing 
BPS:  bond-based profit-sharing 
CPS:  cash-based profit-sharing 
DPS:  · deferred profit-sharing 
ESO:  employee share-ownership 
SO:  stock options 
DSO:  discretionary share options 
ESOP:  employee share-ownership plans 
EBO:  employee buy-outs 
See for the abbreviations used: Annex 2 
3. PEPPER schemes and their effects 
Whereas employee participation in decision making had been widely discussed, ·niore limited 
8 attention has been paid to PEPPER. In particular until the PEPPER-report of 1991, littlo wu 
known about the concrete application of  PEPPER schemes in practice, their diffusion or condition•. 
The first PEPPER-report gave a first insiaht into the practice in Member State~ and hiahli&htod_tho. 
main findm'gs on the effects of PEPPER Sc:bcmes on company peafonnance. 
~complete explanation of  the ~os  why firms adopt PEPPER schemes-seems -impossible oa the 
basis of current evidence. However, they are foWld more often in larger, more profitable finns, 
mu,tinatinationa(s, financial sector companies and firms with higher than averaae skills. A 
considerable body of  evidence suggests that the introduction of profit-sharing is associated with a 
rise in the level of  productivity in the finn. 
Productivity effects 
As increased competition in product maikets has led to a search for better company performance, 
attention has been given to ways of rewarding workers for their output, rather than for their time 
(input). The consistency of  the findings on the incentive effect on profitability is remarkable. 
Profit-sharing is associated with higher productivity levels in every case, regardless of  methods, 
model specification and data used
3
. The experience to date suggests that probably cash-based 
schemes may have had more significant incentive effects than share-based schemes. This is 
supported by both econometric estimates and by attitude surveys
4
• To attain the same beneficial 
effects as from cash-based schemes, firms setting up share-based schemes would have to offer 
more generous conditions than has been the case to date. 
Wage flexibility and employment 
The effects of profit-sharing on employment through greater wage  flexibility are much more 
debatable, as the econometric evidence is inconclusive. On the one hand some earlier evidenc;e for 
the UK suggested that profit-sharing has a positive and significant effect on employment, but more 
recent estimates show that the size of  the effect is not necessarily very large. On the other hand, 
evidence from  France suggests that profit-sharing has resulted in greater wage flexibility, less 
frequent adjustments in employment, and in higher and more stable employment growth. For the 
United States, there is some evidence that profit--sharing finns display lower employment 
variability over the cycle
5
. 
These results on productivity and wage flexibility could have at least two beneficial effects which 
favour public policy attention and support. First, it would reduce the level· of  un~mployment. 
Second, it would increase the degree of attachment between employees and their Companies, 
encouraging skill fonnation. The Pepper-report of 1991  reports that the incidence of PEPPER is 
still comparatively low despite re~t  growth in some cases. Given its potential benefits, this is 
. surprising and underlines the importance of  efforts to cneour.igc the flow of relevant infonnation 
1  Sec  Pepper-report (1991) p187-188;  OECD (1995) Employment  Outlook.  Paris,  July  1995,  p.l60; Sec for  UK: 
Wadbwhani and Wall (1990); and, Cable and Wilson (1990).  ·  ·  ' 
•  See Pepper-report (1991), p.l87 
~  See OECD (199S), p.16(t, xe for UK:  Bradley and Estrin (1992). 
9 both about schemes and ~bout appropriate ways .of introducing schemes in different types of 
companies and in different national circumstances. For example, some studies have noted that 
productivity gains are more likely to occur in fimts with a participatory atmosphere, i.e. with more 
employee involvement in general (industrial  ·  · 
10 democracy and direct participation}. In recent years there has been more discussion
6 on the . 
potential opportunities for public policy and action at other levels to promote· employee 
involvement  · 
Role of governments 
· In addition to. the above arguments in favour of PEPPER schemes, reference can be made to an 
important argument in the explanatory memorandum of  the Commission's proposal for the 
Recommendation of July 1992. The development of financial participation schemes is strongly 
influenced by government action. Governments arc primarily responsible for the creation of  a legal 
and fiscal framework that may favour such schemes but may also impede their introduction. This is 
illustrated by the finding of  the PEPPER-report that in those countries where a particular type of 
financial participation scheme has been encouraged by government, the schemes most commonly 
introduced by companies are indeed the ones promoted through official government measures. In 
particular the availability of  tax incentives makes a big difference. Such incentives may only be 
needed temporarily:  on~  the relevant scheme has gained a certain momentum, the incentive can 
often be reduced or phased out. The findings of the PEPPER-report suggest that the potential 
advantages of  financial participation schemes are largely enhanced by tax incentives. 
Finally, governments can encourage the use of financial participation schemes by supplying 
adequate information to all potentially interested parties including in particular information about 
the experiences acquired in other Member States. 
Different official govenunent positions in individual Member States must be seen against a 
background of  differing traditions and. especially large differences in actual experience in practiee 
with regard to financial participation schemes. In  1991, it was reported that in France and the  UK 
government policies had been actively encouraging the use of financial  participation schemes. for a 
considerable number of years. In  Belgium. Denmark. Germanv. Greece. Ireland. Italv and the 
Netherlands. financial participation schemes of various types had been the subject of national 
debate but government support had either been limited or lacking, or had emerged fairly recently. 
An important issue in political discussions in many countries bact been, and to some extent still is, 
whether schemes at company-level, or more central collective schemes, ought to be encouraged. In 
Denmark. Gennanv and Italy in particular, the issue of economy-wide wage-earners' funds was at 
the centre of the debate, but due to the absence of  a general consensus and insufficient support for 
compulsory collective arrangements, none of the proposals adV1nced had been adopted. In 
Luxembourg, Portugal and ~  the financial participation issue had  s~ far rere.ived .on,ly  limited 
attention, nor had it been among the priority issues for discussion between the social partners. In 
the next chapter we will investigate whether interest in  financial participation matters has increased 
in some of these countries. 
II  OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE MEMBER STATES 
6  See for instance, Ida Regalia ( 1995) Humanize Work and Increase Profitability?  Direct partic,ipbtfon  in organisatiotral-
cllange  viewed by the  social partners in  Europe.  European  Foundation  for  the  Improvement of Living  and Working 
Conditions, Dublin; and the follow up of  the White Paper Growth, Competitiveness,  Emp1oymcn·t~ of  the Expert Working 
Group Flexibility and Work Organisation.  Report by G.  Bosch, Supplement 1/95 to Social Europe, Brussels, 1995. 
11 This chapter gives an overview of  the situation in each Member State. The general PEPPER tables 
included in this chapter present the diffusion of  the schemes in the Member States. 
'  . 
Belaium 
Since the adoption of the EU-Recommendation on PEPPER-schemes in  1992, the Belgian 
government has not taken new initiatives for the promotion of employee financial participation. 
The growth of financial participation in Belgium is still hampered by the lack of  a consistent and 
specific legal framework and tax incentives, particularly for profit-sharing. 
From  1994 until the end of 1996 the Belgian government has even prevented the further growth of 
schemes by prohibiting the establishment of new financial participation plans in the context of the 
aencral wage freeze. 
However, since June  1995 under the new government programme financial participation is beeing 
actively discussed in Belgium during the examination by the government of legislative measures to 
encourage profit-sharing, as part of income-policy. and wage moderation to stimulate employment. 
These plans, although still unclear, are now beeing discussed by the social partners in the context 
of a revision of "the Competitive"ess Act" of 1989 and the wage formation system. 
Current legislation offers tax deductions for the acquisition of new shares by employees in  the 
employing company, which cannot be sold before 5 years, and regulates some forms of  employee 
share-ownership, such as  new share issues reserved to employees on preferential terms, and stock-
options plans. There is no specific legislation, nor tax incentives for profit-sharing, either cash or 
deferred .. 
There are no statistics available on the diffusion of Pepper-schemes in  Belgium. A survey carried 
out in  1991-1992 indicated that share schemes are more widespread than profit-sharing plans. They 
are applied in a variety of sectors but seem to be more usual  in  large industrial and commercial 
firms, in the financial sector and in multinational companies. PEPPER schemes in Belgium a:re 
mostly established on the initiative of management and much less as a result of collective 
bargaining.  · 
Up to last year, the Belgian government has remained vei)' passive about the promotion of Pepper-
schemes. Experiences from other EO-countries have  only served as inspiration for a few proposals 
for laws formulated in the nineties. 
12 GENERAL PEPPER TABLE 1 
.:::: 
General sttuaUon:  LegiSlation  D1ITusion  ot PEPPER schemes  Change  1991-1995 
' 
Couniiy 
Spec1fic laws  &  Tax benefits  Prevalent types:  No.  of schemes/ fmns  Employees  Employee benellts or 
Year of introduc- Involved:  involved:  profit share I employee: 
lion: 
Belgium  unfavourable but dis- ESO:  (1983,1986)  Rather l11nitcd  ESO  Quoted companies  1994:  36,900  .  d.n.a.  d.n.a 
.··  cussed today; PS and ESO  SO:  (1984,1990)  especially  for ·  employees 
· prohibited due to wage  Preferential share  ESO an SO  -
freeze  offers (1991  Act) 
Vanous of CPS  multmaUona1s;  hnanctal  d.n.a.  5% distributable profits;  govenunentplansfor 
&  DPS, incl.  PS  sector,  10% of large  roughly  1,~% to 6% of  legislation of PS  in 
certilieates  companies( survey)  salary  near future; 
Denmark  Discussions in  1994  On SPS and ESO  Some lor SPS,  UPS  27 (1995)  d.n.a  d.n.a. 
(since  1958)  BPS and  ESO 
-modest but relatively 
steady interest 
ESO  16 (1994)  d.n.a  d.n.a. 
SPS  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  d.n.a. 
Germany  Favourable except for  Some on  ESO;  Only lor ESO  ESO &  DPS  1,500-2,000  tmns  about 1.5  300 DM per year-0.6%  slight mcrease 
CPS; appeal to social part- minor changes:  million  of the average gross 
ners.  1994  (inventory  wage 
1994) 
; 
Greece  No discusstons  Some on CPS  For both fmns  d.n.a.  d.n.n.  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  d.n.a. 
(1984) and ESO  & employees  . 
(1987)  ..  substantial  .  I 
Spam  Appeal to  soc11.1  partners  Only general prov1- Minor, except  CPS  No. ot collecUvc agree- Covered by  d.n.a  slight decrease  . 
I 
\  sions in  Workers'  for EBO  mcnts with clauses on  these agree-
·- Statute &· EBO  CPS:  1,087 (1994)  ments:  .  (1986)  1.8 million 
d.n.a =  data not available;  for abbreviations used see annex  1 of this report 
13 Denmark 
In Denmark there was much discussion of national employee funds during the 1970s and 1980s, 
butnone of  the proposals has been implemented. Denmark currently has no legislation designed to 
encourage cash-based profit-sharing, which is thought to be rare. 
There are, however, three PEPPER schemes: two based on shares (SPS) and (ESO), and one on 
bonds (BPS). All schemes are voluntary in that it is up to the individual undertaking to apply for 
pennission to apply them (schemes involve certain tax concessions and must therefore be approved 
by the Minister for Taxation). 
There are two separate schemes covering employee shares. The first allows employees to buy 
shares at a preferential rate. It is a condition that each individual employee is entitled to purchase 
shares with a value of up to 10% of  his or her wage. Employees are not taxed on shares, but if · 
they dispose of them the nonnal rules on share profit taxation apply. There are no special statistics 
on the number of schemes or the number of employees covered by such schemes. 
The second type of share scheme was introduced in 198 7 and allows each employee to be allocated 
free shares with a value of up to DKR 6 000 per year (but not exceeding 10% of his or her wage). 
A condition is that the shares are retained for seven years. The shares are not taxed on allocation, 
but the nonnal rules on share profit taxation apply when they are disposed of. 
There are no statistics of how many employees are covered, but the number of schemes is as 
follows: 
1987:  6 
1988:  10 
1989:  20 
1990:  20 
1991:  14 
1992:  16 
1993:  16 
1994:  16 
The figure for  1995  is not yet available. 
Since 1958 it has been possible to  issue bonds to employees free of  charge and tax-free. 
Employees do, however, have to pay tax on dividends. As of 1 January  1996 there are no tax 
implications for the employer, up to DKR 1 800 per employee. If the value of bonds exceeds this 
amount, the employer must pay a levy of  45%. To compensate, the full  cost, i.e.  the value of  the 
bonds plus the 45% levy and dividends, is tax-deductible for the employer. 
To be approved, a scheme must be open to all employees and the value of bonds plus the 45% 
levy must not exceed  lO% of the employee's annual wage. Bonds must be retained for five years. 
No statistics are kept of  the number of employees issued with employee hoods, but the number of 
schemes is as follows: 
1992:  32 
1993:  25 
1994:  28 
1995:  27 
1996:  5 (first quarter only). 
14 It is difficult to provide an overall view of  the diffusion of PEPPER schemes in Denmark, as only 
those mentio~ed above (which iequire approval) are registered. Similarly, there are no statistics of 
the. number of  employees covered. The nwnbr.r of  schemes approved suggests a relatively steady · 
but modest use of PEPPER schemes.  .  '  · 
In recent years a number of  public limited companies have been set up in the state sector. The 
operation of  the individual companies is subject to market conditions and the laws setting up these 
eompanies provide for the possibility of  issuing employee shares. Furthermore, it is possible to ·pay 
performance-related salaries to employees in the state s~r. 
Germany 
German legislation provides no incentives for profit sharing. However, there is a considerable body 
of regulations designed to encour~e employee share-holding and capital accumulation; Direct 
guidelines to the parties concerned are not considered to be a responsibility of  the German 
government. Employees' savings are invemd in accordance with agreements with workers. It is 
possible for the social partners to develop their own type of scheme. The German government has 
recently taken the initiative to develop legislative regulations in which individual firm level 
. schemes could be promoted, developed, disseminated and sustained within the context of central 
agreements between social partners. 
The regulations offers incentives related to individual workers' savings. Concessions are offered to 
low earners (single people: up to 27,000 DM; manied:.up to 54,000 OM annual income) and ifthe 
participation is committed in a specific form of investment for a minimum retention period of 6 
years. 
The concessions offered consist of a low bonus paid by the State which amounts to 10% of the 
invested money in productive capital up to maximum of 936 DM per year. 
In addition the Income Tax: Law enables employees, who are offered price-reduced shares by their 
employers, to receive for these benefits exemption from  tax and social insurance payments up to a 
maximum tax-free amount of OM 300, on condition that companies subsidise the acquisition  up to 
50% of  the interest value and that shares ~e  frozen for a period of 6 years. 
While .Germany grants no concessions to cash-based profit-sharing schemes, they are relatively 
common in the small number of firms which also have deferred or share-based schemes. The 
. number of the schemes in Germany has changed only slightly. Specific figures on the number of 
general profit sharing schemes are not available. The value of  employee capital has risen from OM 
15  billion to OM 20 billion. Other sources report a slight increase in the number of  employees 
covered. 
In  1995, the German government appealed to the social partners to consider employee share-
ownership and other related schemes as part of  their wage-agreements. The'  possible advantages of 
that wage policy for employment-growth, a more equitable income and capital distribution were 
also stressed in new initiatives regarding employee share ownership. The German government has 
tried to cronvince the social partners to encourage these schemes, but despite this appeal their use is 
not widespread in Germany. The situation in former East Germany is expected to be even worse. 
The Germm government reports the need for new initiatives from the social partners to help to 
create an environment for private employee investments to enhance employment growth; to 
encourage employee participation in capital; and to improve employee involvem~nt in enterprise.  .  . 
Greece 
15 During the 1980's, especially after 1987, the Greek government actively supported PEPPER 
schemes through legislation offering tax incentives to both companies and employees. There is a 
special legal framework for employee participation in both enterprise profits and assets. Provisions 
regulate two principal types of PEPPER scheme, namely cash-based ,profit-sharing and employee 
share-ownership. They are voluntary. Since 1990 no specific regulatjons have been reported. 
Companies are allowed to distribute part of  their net revenue or profits to their employees iri cash. 
This may not exceed 15% of  annual net profit per financial year. Companies adopting this fonn are 
obliged to draw up a list enumerating the beneficiaries, and the amounts granted to each individual 
employee, a copy of which must be sent to the workers' council. Both the employees and the 
company are granted tax benefits. The employee benefits are considered as income from moveable 
goods. Distributed profits are not included in employees' social security contributions and also 
since 1990 these distributed profits are exempt from employers' social security contributions. 
Companies are also allowed to distribute shares to their personnel or to the personnel of  ancillary 
firms. For the employees the income deriving from these shares is exempt from tax and from 
social charges, while dividends and interest payments on shares distributed to personnel are subject 
to income tax on moveable assets. For the company, capital allocated for shares to be distributed to 
employees is exempt from tax, but cannot exceed 20% of  profits. 
The general attitude is that interested parties (employers and workers) can make arrangements for 
promoting these schemes on a national, local, sectoral or occupational level. The bodies concerned 
are responsible for any agreements made in respect of specific arrangements and subsequent 
practices. In addition parties may also introduce arrangements by means of individual contracts and 
regulations. Choices may be included in collective labour agreements. 
Spain 
In Spain, any .provisions concerning ex-tra payments are regulated by the Workers' Statute. There is 
no discussion. of specific policy and activities regarding PEPPER schemes. Spanish legislation does 
offer the possibility of introducing employee participation in enterprise profits, although no special 
benefits are provided either to firms or to employees. A  1986-law regulates employee buy-outs. 
There are no plans to introduce legislation to change these tax arrangements. 
Profits can be distributed in t\vo different ways: as direct labour compensation or through the 
establishment of funds for specific collective goals. According to company tax law these profits are 
considered as labour costs on two conditions: that such compensation is included in collective 
agreements, and that the motive behind the compensation is  for work done.  For the allocation of 
funds specific categories are treated as  reducible expenses. From the fiscal  point of view profits 
related payments  to employees are treated as  normal wages. 
Since 1986 employees are allowed to take over companies, so called workers' cOmpanies 
(SSAALL). 1l1is type of worker-owned company, in which no  le-;s  than 51% of capital is owned 
by its employees, may under certain conditions have the right t  a 99% tax exemption from  capital 
transfer tax. 
There are no specific statistics on the schemes. General information on the content of collective 
agreements which include clauses on financial participation, suggests a slight deqline in the number 
of clauses concerning bonuses directly related to productivity. Tax investigat~on has revealed that 
mainly large companies use this kind of incentive for their workers.  ·  · 
16 As a result of  the limited rules in Spain in this area the social partners choose which particular 
participation scheme they want to use. It is through collective agreements and individual 
employment contracts that the type of participation which companies and employees regard as 
appropriate is fixed.  A basic criterion in all cases is that participation should not be part of  the 
basic wage but a supplement to it. Recently, as a maj~r breakthrough, in the negotiations now 
under way account is being taken of  the Government's proposal to link increases in wages and 
salaries with productivity improvements. 
France 
As a result of continuous government support for employee financial participation since the end of 
the fifties, French legislation offers a legal framework and generous tax advantages to a .variety of 
financial participation forms:  voluntary cash-based profit-sharing, deferred profit-sharing, employee 
share-ownership and company savings plans. The politiCal consensus that PEPPER schemes should 
further be encouraged through official government policies has led to new legislative initiatives in 
1993 and  1994. The principal objective was to give financial participation a new impetus by 
removing a number of obstacles originating from the 1990 legislation, a simplification of existing 
regulations in the legislative framework of 1986 and an extension of fiscal  incentives .. 
Besides the already substantial tax benefits, the law of 1994 has particularly increased the tax 
advantages for deferred profit-sharing and company savings plans .. Notably, these measures which 
aim to encourage long term savings and investment, are combined in the same law with specific 
measures to stimulate short-term consumption and encourage work-sharing by means of profit-
sharing.  · 
Cash-based profit-sharing in  France is  intended to provide a supplement to basic wages, linked to 
some measure to the economic performance of the firm. The  1994 law has reinforced and adapted 
some of the conditions to be fulfilled for tax relief (including social security contributions), such 
as: 
- the collective and variable character of the scheme; 
- the principle of no-substitution with other forms of remuneration; 
- the increase of the maximum proportion of  the total gross payroll allocated as profit-sharing to 
20% (10% since  1990); 
- the principle of uniform calculations for all categories of employees. 
More than 2.5  million employees are now covered by about 8,000 agreements for cash-based 
profit-sharing. After a period a spectacular expansion in the second half of  the eighties, the number 
of agreements declined markedly in the early nineties, due to a number of extensions of the 
compulsory deferred scheme to smaller companies. Since  1993 the number of schemes for cash-
based profit-sharing increased again. Large disparities have been observed· in the amount of the 
bonus in different sectors and companies of  different sizes.  · · 
Deferred profit-sharing has been an important vehicle for fmancial participation in France. France 
is the only European country where the participation in ·company profits is obligatory for 
companies of a certain size. All firms with a minimum workforce of 50 employees (100 in  1990) 
are required to establish a deferred profit-sharing fund. This explains why France is also the Euro-
pean country where financial participation is most widespread. Employees can OQly get the 
accumulated amounts at their disposal after 5 (or 3) years. The amounts are tpen.ox.empted from 
income tax and social security contributions (in part).  · 
17 The 1994 la\v extended the deferred profit- sharing schemes to smaller companies which apply the. 
scheme: or a  ~oluntary bases (fewer than 51 employees), and has also increased the tax incentives · 
for thes~ companies. In  1994 the participation increased to nearly  16,000 agreements covering 
more ·than 19,000 companies.and more than S million employees. 
In addition to the adaptations made the new .law of 1994 introduced some remarkable new 
measures, inspired by industrial democracy and macro-economic developments, such as: 
- the encouragement of  the participation of  employee-shareholders in the management of  the firm; · 
-the possibility of  introducing a "tinie savings account" by collective agreement, allowing 
employees to convert their profit-sharing bonuses into paid time off; 
- the possilility for companies to "un-freeze" their deferred profit sharing funds for the purchase of 
a new car or for constru(;tion works~  · 
- the creation of  the Superior Council of Participation ·(CSP). 
The creation of  the CSP illustrates the.Jimportance of  the issue of  employee (financial)' participation 
to the French government. The principal objectives and responsibility of  the Council are to watch 
over the application of  financial participation and participation in management by French firms, 
coordinate all initiatives leading to their further extension and produce an annual report for the 
Prime Minister and the Parliament summarising all developments in financial participation plans 
(voluntary and compulsory profit-sharing and company savings plans) and in wage bargaining in 
those companies where voluntary profit-sharing agreements have been conCluded. 
The involvement and infonnation ofthe social partners has  been activated by the presentation of 
c:n annual report on the use of the schemes promoted by the government and by tlte publication of 
brochures on financial participation by the Ministry of Labour.  One possible new development 
which could result from the present discussions in the Superior Council would be the extension of 
company savings plans to retirement savings plans. 
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General Attitude:  Leg1slabon  Dilllls1on of PEPPER schemes  Cllange ! 991-
1995. 
Cour.try 
..  Spec1hc  Jaws & Y  car  Tax bcnehts  Prevalent  No. ol schemes/ llnns  Employees mvolvcd:  Employee benelitS 
of introduction:  types:  Involved:  or profit share I · · 
employee: 
France  very  favourable and  Since  1995 on CPS  Substantial for bolh  DPS  19,000 linns and  1993:  5.15  milbon  Average PS 4,2%  Substantial 
discussed  and since  1967170 on  fmns and employees;  15,780 agreements  of earnings  increase 
DPS, SO and ESO  further improved  in  I 
·several changes;  1994  -
Important 
improvements in 
legislation in  1994 
CPS  8,800 agreements  2,5 nullion  averqe 2.9% of  Substantial 
earnings  increase 
ESO  0.75 nulbOn  ·~ 
DSO  200 quoted comparues  .d.n.a  c!..!!..a 
EHO  600  lrom  1984-1990; :)5  ·  d.n.a.  d.n  .... 
since  1992 (estimate) 
CPS  2500 to 3000  d.n.a.  d.n.a. 
!Miand  ·  VISCussed  111 Nabonal  ~  for ESO, SPS  ConslCierable  .  Eso.~  d.n.a .  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  .  mcrease 
Propnune  and SO  improvement in  1995  &SO  . 
Italy  DISCussed today; appeal  Some provisions in  No  mcentives  PS  300 schemes (  csbmatc  900,000  d.n.a.  unknown 
to. social partners  Civil Code and  1991); Survey:  in 21% of  (estimate 1991) 
(1993)  Workel'li' Stntute  COII1Jlllllic.'l employee incen- upprox. 6% of 
lives bnlied on productivity  employees  . 
so  quoted (pnvabscd) com- d.n.a.  d.n.a.  s11ght mcrcasc 
panics 
d.n.a =  data not  available;.~ for abbreviations used annex  1 of lhis report 
19 Ireland 
The legislation covering approved PEPPER schemes in Ireland is essentially· set out in the Finanee 
Act of 1982 and the Finance Act of 1986. Under such schemes, as approved by the Revenue 
Commissioners, companies can allocate shares to their employees. These are, subject to certain 
conditions, exempt from a tax charge on the initial value and subsequent growth of  the shares. 
There are no specific legal provisions for cash-based profit sharing. 
The legislation g_rants certain tax relief to participants of  approved shared:-based profit sharing and 
stock option schemes. The Finance Acts of 1982 and  1986 introduced tax concessions for 
employees and for their companies under the obligation of  the establishment of  a trust, which 
acquires the shares on behalf of  the employees. In order to gain full income tax relief, the shares 
must remain in trust for 5 years. The Finance Act 1995, increased the annual limit on relief for 
approved employee profit sharing schemes from £2,000 to £10,000. This substantial increase in the 
relief limit is expected to generate a proportionate increase in the number of  approved profit 
sharing schemes, thus promoting greater participation by employees in the ownership of  their 
enterprises with the consequent and attendant benefits of  greater productivity, jmproved industrial 
relations etc. 
Following the changes introduced by the Finance Act,  1995, a significant increase is expected in 
the use of PEPPER schem~s. The adoption of employee share ownership schemes has received a 
greater degree of attention in view of  the recent equity participation by employees in a number of 
high-profile semi-State organisations. 
Under a current National Programme in Ireland, the Programme for Competitiveness and Work, 
(which is a Programme agreed at national level between the Government and the·social partners) 
both the Government and the social partners are committed to publicising and encouraging the 
adoption of a number of employment level initiatives including financial involvement by 
employees. The choice as to whether an organisation introduces a profit sharing scheme or a stock 
option arrangement is, however, ultimately a matter for the employer. 
' 
Italy 
PEPPER related schemes were given a major breakthrough in  Italy by the agreement of 23 July 
1993 between the Government and the social partners. This agreement made it possible to 
overcome the main obstacle to greater use in Italy of schemes to promote employee participation in 
a firm's profits and results, i.e. the wage-setting system, which gave businesses little scope for 
raising employee remuneration over and above the increases established by collective agreements. 
Through this agreement the Social Partners and the Government took note of the need to introduce 
all the necessary measures to increase participation by employees in company performance, by 
providing that at company level the amounts paid would be related to the-company's economic 
results and based on three indicators: productivity, quality and profitability.  -
TI1erc are currently two main forms of participation: participation of  employees in a company's re-
sults and in its equity. There are no specific incentives. 
Workers may be remunerated in whole or in part through participation in  company profitS or yield. 
The contributions are linked to pay and may not exceed  10% (1993). TI1e Civil Code and the 
Workers' Statute stipulate that any form of payment made to workers for  wh~tev~r; reason must be 
considered to be part of remuneration. 
20 Employees are offered three ways of participating in equity: 
_ a proportion of  the shares which the business puts on the market is eannarked for employees at a 
price below the market value, but the majority of  shareholders may decide that these shares will 
not be accompanied by voting rights; 
- a fixed number of  shares offered to employees iri the event of a public share offer~ 
- an offer of investment plans to employees as part of the shares package earmarked for them. 
One  intere~ting development which has certainly enhanced profit sharing in Italy relates to what is 
known as direct participation in business-employee relations. Total quality plans are to be used to 
establish forms of direct employee involvement in the production objectives of  the business in 
order to emphasise in a progressive way significant shared interests of  the business and its 
employees. 
There are, as yet, no official estimates of  the incidence of financial participation schemes in Italy. 
A survey carried out in 1991 on a sample of 104 companies showed that employee incentives in 
21% of the companies were based exclusively on productivity. In  62% of  the companies, payments 
were related to profitability, quality indicators and attendance indicators. In most cases these 
paymentS were based on in-company data. It has been estimated from  other sources that, in  1991, 
around 900,000 workers were involved in 300 schemes providing for at least some element of 
profit sharing. These figures represent just under 6 per cent of the total number of  employees in 
Italy. 
In  recent years many companies have taken steps to offer shares to their employees, notably 
companies in the banking, finance and insurance sectors. In the past year in  particular the 
acquisition of shares by employees has  been encouraged, as public undertakings have been 
privatised. In  collective labour agreements renewed  in  1994 in the banking, textiles and clothing, 
chemicals, fruits and vegetable sectors and a number of industrial and manufacturing sectors, joint 
committees have been set up for the establishment of supplementary benefit funds. 
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,  .  Geneial Attitude:  Legislation  Difiusion o( PEPPER schemes  Change  19~1-1995 
.Country 
Spccthc laws &  Y  car  Tax bcnehts  Prevalent  No. ol schemes/  Employees  Employee benefits 
Of introduction:  types:  firms Involved:  involved:  or profit shale I 
employee: 
Luxem- Di~ussed~ govenunent con- None  No  incentives  CPS  26% of com- d.n.n.  4.5-8% of  net tax- slight increase 
bourg  sidcrs initiatives:  Law pro- panics (mainly  able profits 
posal on ESO by  parties  banks) (1995) 
Netherlands  favourable and discussed  In  1994 improved  Substantial  CPS  5.2% or ftrms  11.5%  5.~  of average  mc:n:ase m number ol  . , 
legislation on CPS;  improvements in  1994  earnings  employees 
BPS and SO on the 
basis of company  ·' 
saving schemes 
'  so  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  ~ted  increase due to 
- integration with com-
pany- saving schemes 
"DPS"  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  I 
Austna  favourable,  but sceptical  Labour Law  1974/  only  lor ESO  Data only for large cnletprtses 
especially on ESO  revised:  1994;  .. 
Income Law  1994 
ESO  20 schemes  approx.  18,000  1  ')(,.45" or  capttal.  mcrease 
so  I  400  d.n.a.  ·unknown 
..  ESOP  2  approx.  340  d.n.a.  unknown 
PS  I  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  unknown 
Ponugal  .Min u discussions  Since  1989  Incentives lor I  :nns  PS  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  unknown 
privatisation law  wil11  PS; ESO  . 
rriJvid~ for  ESO;  PS  incentives for both  .. 
l:.1sed  on  1969  law  fmns  and cmploycc.o; 
ESO  quoted com- cntployee share- d.n.a.  smce 1989 mcreasc 
- '  panics  holders:  12,4% of  under privatisation 
shareholders 
0 
'  (1994) 
.n.a = Clata not avatlllble; see lor abSrevJAtions used annex  I ot Utts report 
22 Luxembourg 
In Luxembourg there are still no legal structures to regulate or facilitate the introduction of 
employee financial participation, although there is a growing interest on the part of  the goVCI'DII\erit 
and the social partners in recent years. At present views iLbout the type of  schemes that should be 
encouraged, .differ S\rongly among the parties concerned. 
Proposals to favour employee share schemes are not direcdy sup~rtcd neither by trade unic;)Os, 
who fear the loss of  control of  their bargaininJJ independence, r.or by employers. Employers are. 
more in favour of  flexible pay, by adding a variable clement uf remuneration to a fixed base wage, 
whereas the government cOnsiders profit-sharing to be a  vo~untary and motivating instrument 
separate from ~age  negotiations. 
Despite the absence of  a legal framework and tax incentives, a modest but real growth of financial 
participation practice has been observed since 1990, compared to the eighties. Cash-p~tit sharing 
is more widespread than share-ownership and occurs mostly in the financial sector and as a  result 
of  management initiatives. 
After minor intereo:;t in the eighties, financial participation is now being discussed seriously by the 
social partners and in Parliament. Up t0 now the government has not taken part in the debate, but 
is considering legal initiatives to ercourage the growth of financial participation in Luxembourg. 
Netherlands 
In the eighties discusfions on encouraging PI:PPER schemes in the Netherlands took place at a 
national level. 1his resulted in a detailed proposal on tax-incentives for profit sharing. From 
January 1st 1994 a number of financial participation arrangements have been modified and some 
fiscal incentivi.!S enhanced in order to encourage employers to set up financial schemes and 
employees to participate in them (Law Vem1eend/Vreugendenhil). The main basis of the law is for 
a saving scheme or personnel fund.  It also provides an adequate legal structure for financial  .. 
participation in general. 
In the Netherlands, the variety of profit sharing schemes is limited, certainly in comparison with 
other countries, sucit as the United Kingdom and France. There are two different profit-sharing 
schemes for which fiscal incentives are available: cash-based profit sharing and deferred profit 
sharing. However, ~h  based a profit sharing appears to be the prevalent fo.rm.  Of  course, 
employers can take other measures in order to Calculate the profit sharing benefit, and instead of. 
payments they can opt for options on stocks etc. A central feature of  the 1994 Law is the wage-
saving scheme. The w ~e  saving scheme and the premium saving scheme are the most important 
savings systems practi~;ed by companies. Both schemes were established with the aim of 
moderating annual wage growth. Workers are encouraged to save money, and employers to set up 
schemes, by means of tiscal incentives. It is  possible to make use of both schemes at the same 
time. Savings can  be converted into shares. However, there  i~ no direct relationship between 
savings on the one hand and performance and results (profits) on the other.  . 
To encourage participation in profit-sharing, the Government in 1994 raised the tax free benefit 
and shortened the retention period. Dmployers who use this scheme need to pay a total .charge of 
20% (instead of  35% before 1994). In exchange for payments, the employer may offer the worker 
an option  con the firms shares. The total value of  this option is limited to a maxim!lm of  HFL 1580 
a year. 
23 Stock options can be part of  a saving scheme and are  ~ubject to the same tax-incentives as the 
wage saving· scheme. :An additional requirement is that the value of  the options is fixed at 7.5 per 
cent of  the value of  the respective shares. Any revenues from the use of  these options is allocated 
to a special savings account  with a retention period of four years. The amount. will be tax free to a 
maximum (HFL 1580 in 1995). This maximum will be determined yearly by the government;· 
Some ·changes ~·in  preparation. At the moment a total charge of 10% has to be paid by 
employers when they make use of.the wage saving .scheme. It is proposed that this change will be 
reduced to 0% provided that the saving swn consists of  company stocks belonging to either the 
employers' company, or a partnership connCcted with the employer. The second adjustment 
concerns the charge of  20% of  the cash based profit sharing employers have to pay  ..  This ch~e 
might be reduced to 10%, but only if  the employer requests a .reduction. 
The total number of  employees receiving a cash-based profit sharing benefit has grown, but at the 
same time the benefit level has dropped significantly. In 1994, this scheme applied to about 11.5% 
of all employees, against 7.3% in 1993. The total benefit averaged HFL 2426, in  1994, 5.65% of 
the average earnings hourly. This was about 55% lower than the average benefit in 1993. The 
existing arrangements do not discriminate between men and women or other categories of 
beneficiaries. This does not mean, however, that there is equal participation. As n0ted above, the 
extent of participation depends on several aspects, of which wage levels are the most important. 
For higher paid jobs, the benefit is about 1% of  total average hourly earnings (non-participants 
included) and for low paid jobs less than 0.3%. 
In December 1994 almost 26% of  all workers took part in  wage-saving schemes. Reliable 
iilformation on stock options and employee share ownership is not available. 
The introduction of profit-sharing systems is to the responsibility of employers. Because of  this, 
and the fact that, generally, not all the workers in firms exercising cash-based profit sharing 
schemes are entitled to benefit, unions do not support their introduction. This is particularly true if 
such a system implies a lower rate of  growth in the underlying level of wages or in  lower basic 
wages. No figures are available concerning the extent to which cash-based profit sharing systems 
are the subject of collective bargaining. However, the figure is believed to be low. 
Austria 
Schemes to promote employee share-ownership or share based profit sharing in Austria have little 
impact. There is a legal basis only for profit sharing. The social partners are sceptical about share 
based-schemes. According to Austrian Labour Law the Works Councils and the employer can 
agree upon a profit sharing scheme. Parties can develop and regulate individual profit sharing 
schemes provided that they agree on certain conditions. The scheme cannot- be eligible to 
individual employees as such, but must be company wide. 
In Austria the law allows the profit share bonus for white collar workers ("Angestelltengesetzes"), 
personnel cannot be made responsible for the company's losses. It also provides for the company's 
books to be inspected by the personnel. 
If there is any provision for tax-relief on profit-sharing it was not reported 
In general the law permits employee share ownership as part of collective agreements. Since  1994 
the law permits tax-free distribution of shares at a reduced price to employees. Tite maximum tax 
24 free amount is  10,000 S per year. In addition, this scheme must be eligible to all personnel or to a  . 
specific group of  personnel. Dividends are subject to nonnal tax regulations (22% taX} with the 
option for ~e  amount tO be taxed as income tax (which in most cases Is beneficial to employees): 
In  1994 tax: provisions on capital and capital gains were repealed.  ·  .  . . 
There are no statistics on employee share--ownership or profit sharing. However, the information·:: . 
available on employee share:.Ownership in large finns points towards a number of  around 18,000 
employees. It is expected that this number will· increase given the rather short period since the tax . 
free arrangement was granted. PEPPER systems at branch level are mainly found in metal industry. 
Only recently has the question of  PEPPER been discussed and evaluated by employee 
representatives. As a result the Bundesarbeitskammer has decided to make PEPPER part of  the 
training programme for employee representatives and works councils. However, experience shows 
that employee share--ownership appears to be implemented only when the company goes on to the 
Stock Exchange or when the company has economic and financial  problems. Because of  the great 
risks the latter imposes on employees, the Bundesarbeitskammer and the \vorks councils view these 
schemes with scepticism. 
Profit sharing is considered important in the collective agreements policy of  the trade unions for 
developing more flexibility in the wage systems. However, PEPPER  <agreements and discussions 
have a marginal impact and are treated somewhat sceptically. This situation is unlikely to improve 
in the foreseeable future. 
Portugal 
In  Portugal employee participation in enterprise results is covered by labour law and since 1969 
has not been considered as remuneration. Equity participation is closely linked to the public sector 
privatisation policy which was introduced in  1989. The framework law on privatisation provides 
that a percentage of  the equity to  be privatised must be  reserved for small c;ubscribers and 
employees of the enterprise undergoing privatisation. 
The profit-sharing amounts can be deducted from  the taxable  p~ofit for the financial year in 
question on condition that it will be paid or made availaLie to the beneficiaries by the end of  the 
following financial year. Participation in the profits of the company haS  ceased to be a basis for 
imposition of statutory deductions towards social security. 
Equity participation incentives include option plans for the subscription or purchase of shares under 
agreements between firms and their employees and the purchase of shares offered for public sale 
by the State. 
Tax incentives comprise:  . 
..  ' 
- for employees: a deduction from total taxable income of 50% of the amount applicable in  1991 
to option plans created by employers, up to a limit of ESC 250,000. 
- for companies: a deduction from  corporation tax equivalent to the losses and other expenditure as 
a result of employees exercising their rights to share ·subscription or purchase options. 
The tax concession granted with regard to the purchase of shares offered for public sale by the 
State, comprises a deduction from  the total taxable income equivalent to 30% of  ~the 'amount 
applicable up to a certain maximum for a single  per~on, and double the amo411t for both partners 
were they are not legally separated.  ·  · 
25 No information is available regarding the number of workers who have subscribed to option plans 
or  who have purchased shares under privatisation schemes, nor with regard to profit-sharing. Since 
1991 there has been no charge to the tax structure.  · 
As far as the present situation is concerned, the only information available is that, in the case of 
equity participation up to the end of 1994, 130 operarions modifying publi~ participation i~ the 
share capital of 100 companies w~..re carried out. The equity owned by small shareholders and 
employees in their own companies represents 12.4% of  the total number of  shareholde.rs. 
It is important to note that Portugal does not have a tradition of  financial participation by 
employees in profits and enterprise capital, a fact which is attributable mainly to historical and 
socio-cultural factors. Moreover, a large number of national companies (even quite sizeable ones) 
have been undtr continued ownership and ni3nagement and are predominantly family-based. In 
addition, attention should be paid to the fact that. the majority of  businesses in Portugal are small 
and medium-sized businesses, which are not very likely to produce accumulated capital. The 
financial and insurance sector has been the main sector in which the application of  this principle of 
participation and redistribution has been promoted. Recently, there bas been particular interest in 
the subject, as demonstrated by the two fiade union confederations (UGT and CGTP), which 
attempted to include the subject in the Economic and Social Agreement for the year 2000. 
As a rule, the setting up of profit-sharing schemes is not negotiated oeforehand with employees' 
representatives. However there are many cases in which prior consultation with employees' 
representatives does take place, which in some cases leads to substantial improvements in the 
profit-sharing scheme. 
on·e of the sources of inspiration for the system under the Law on privatisation was tl1e  French 
model. The regulations in the United Kingdom and Ireland also served as an example wth regard 
to tax incentives for the financial participation of employees in enterprise capital. 
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General Atu-;  Lcgaslation  Dilliasion of PEPPER schemes  Change 1991-1995 
tude:  .. 
Specillc laws &  Year  Tax bcnehts  Prevalent  No. ol schemes/  Employees mvolved:  Employee benefits or 
of introduction:  types:  farms  Involved:  prnfit share I 
employee: 
Finland  A!linnative and  Personnel funds ( 1990)  incentives lor personnel  DPS (per- · 41  !inns or  90,000  19Q4 approx. 2% of  increase immediately after 
discussed with  with amendments in  funds;  none  for  sonncl  group of !inns  year-income to funds  personnel fund  introduction 
social partners  1996  CPSIESO  fund)  (1994)  in 1990; since then very  few 
new  .. 
CPSIESO  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  1-l'MI or pa1d wages  Ulllalown 
Sweden  Not dtscussed  Only lor prollt-shanng  For employees and  farms  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  d.n.a.  dn.a. 
funds  on payments  to  the 
funds 
United  Very favourable  SPS (1978);  Substantial for both  DSO  4,339  Substantial  ExecUbve Scheme replaced 
Kingdom  & discussed  so (1980)  farms  &  employees  by Company Share Option 
Continuous  DSO (1?84)  In  1991, 1992 and  1994:  Plan with  ~eet  from July 
improvements  CPS (1987)  iricrcases in tax-relief  1995 
ESOPs (1989) 
ESO (1978-)  DSO:  Change from 
In  1991, 1992 and  Executive Scheme to  . 
1994: easing regula- Company Share Option 
lions; All schemes  Plan refocused t;tx  relief 
improved in  1995:  onto those  in lower and 
equal treatment for  middle income ranges 
part-time employees 
July  199S:introduction 
of new Company Share 
Plan (OSO), replacing 
the  1984 Executive  ' 
Scheme 
27 CPS  12,740  approx.  3.5 mtlhon  Maximum profit- very substantial  g~wth  since 
related pay of 20%  1991 
pay or £4000 per 
employee (whichever 
is the lower) 
. 
SPS  868  approx.  I million  Average value of  strong mcrease, little change 
shares appropriated 
1994/95: £ 550 per 
employee 
so  1,174  approx.  I million  Average value of  strong mcrease 
shares over which 
options granted 
1994/95: £ 2,900 per 
employee 
ESOP's  27  d.n.a.  slow mcrease 
Total  19,148 schemes  5.5  min employees  NumberS doubled smce  1991  -
n.a = data not avatJable; see lor abbrevmtlons usea annex  ol thts report 
28 Finland. 
In  1990, Finland introduced a deferred. profit sharing scheme, the "Personnel funds and profit 
bonus system", which provides tax ~centives to employers and is designed to facilitate the  · 
aceumularion of  capital by employees over the longer-term. Payments made by employers into 
personnel funds are deductible in ~on  of  employers and no social security contributions are to 
be paid. After 10 years from the beginning of  the employee's membership in the fund, the  . 
employee is allowed to withdraw annualy one-tenth of  the money in the fund, though the whole  . 
may be withdrawn on leaving the company. Income tax is payable only on withdrawals. The 
amendments to the Personnel Fund Act (1660/95) which came into force at the beginning of 1996· 
shortened the waiting period for withdrawal from  10 years to 5 years and the proportion which can 
be withdrawn eaCh year was raised to 15%. Amendments to the Income Tax Law (227/96), which 
also came into· force in the beginning of 1996, eased the taxation of  members of  Personnel Funds, 
so that 20% of  the earnings from the Personnel Fund are free of  tax and the remaitiing. 80% are 
taxable as income under income tax laws. 
The fund may invest its assets in the employer's company or in a company which belongs to the 
same group. If  the fund invests its assets in the shares of  the employer's company, the personnel 
will, through the fund, become a share owner of  the company. When the fund invests its assets 
outside its own company, the investment must be secure and yield profit. The yield of  the 
investment activity is added to the members' fund shares each year. 
In Finland there are no legal obstacles to cash-based and share-based profit-sharing schemes. The 
staff are given additional rewards in cash on the basis of the profit or other economic result of the 
company, but the law itself does not provide any special treatment. These profit premiums paid in 
cash are taxed in the same way as employees' other earned income. 
The Income Tax Law provides a right for employees to subscribe to shares or interests at a 
favourable price. The advantage is tax-free if the discount is at most 10 percent of the current 
price, with a further condition that the majority of the personnel has access to the advantage. 
When the· Personnel Fund Act came into force at the beginning of 1990, it was greated with 
considerable enthusiasm. The majority of the present funds came into existence either in the year 
the law entered or during the following year. Since then very few  new funds have been set up. The 
main reason for the decline of interest has probably been the recession at the beginning of  the 
1990's which did not create a climate for the establishment of  new funds. 
In  1994, the general personnel funds were found in 41  eompanies (or groups of  companies) 
covering 90,000 employees. There is no reliable and complete information available with regard to 
other profit schemes in Finnish companies. According to a survey in manufacturing, construction 
and some service sectors, the profit-based instalments paid to manual workers were  1.2 percent of 
total wages. For clerical employees the share of the profit and incentive wages waS  1.8 percent of 
the monthly earnings. The number of clerical employees who receive wages based on profit and 
performance has grown considerably during the last 10 years. In  1994 on average every fourth 
clerical employee received profit and incentive wages, in  1984 it was less than five percent. On the 
other hand the proportion of monthly earnings deri.ved from profit and incentive wages has 
declined amongst those clerical employees who receive them. The share varied between 5 and 1 
percent in different groups of  clerical employees in  1994 and in  1984 between 5 :and' 13  percent. 
The closest models for the Finnish personnel fund model arc found in Swedi;h·· ~dation-based 
voluntary funds, in particular the Handelsbanken fund. The French systems of  voluntary profit 
29 premium and: fund schemes have also served as models. 
During the last year there have been animated discussions regarding the funds.-The negotiations 
concerning the soci~~conomic, employment and labour market policy agreement for the years 
1996-1997 between the State and the social partners in Autumn  19'>5 also dealt with matters 
relating to the  personnel funds. It is envisaged, that the lively discussion about personnel fundS 
and law refonns with regard to the funds, when implemented, will promote the establishment of 
new funds, and the introduction ·of other.  fonns of profit-sharing schemes in companies. 
Sweden 
3weden does not have any specific system for direct proJUotion of participation by employees in 
companies' profits. Swedish fiscal legislation is mainly based on the principle that all employment-
derived remuneration, in the fonn of  wages or other benefits, is subject to tax. At present, 
result/profit participation schemes attract no special tax relief for either employers or employees .. 
However, there is statutory provis~on, in the Act of 1981  on Social Contributions, for an exception 
aimed at promoting certain specific indirect benefits for employees. This applies to the transfer of 
profits to special statutory funds established by the employees or workers'· organisation in an 
enterprise (known as "profit-sharing funds"). The funds transferred to the foundations are mainly 
intended to reward employees for their efforts. 
Employees do not pay tax on payments to a profit-sharing foundation at the time when the 
payment is made, nor does the payment create entitlement to benefit. Employers' contributions are 
therefore not payable on the funds transferred. When funds are disbursed from a profit-sharing 
foundation, the recipient is  liable to tax on the payment received. However, the foundation is not 
required to pay ~mployer's contributions on the disbursement, which therefore does not give rise to 
benefit entitlemeQt. This exception applies only on the condition th.at the funds 
- are to be held by the foundation for at least three calendar years; 
- benefit a substantial proportion (at least one third) of the employees on similar tenns; and 
- are not paid to managers, co-proprietors or their relatives in close companies or finns with a 
small number of  O\~ners. 
United Kingdom 
There is a long. tradition of financial participation in  ~he United Kingdom. Since 1978, significant 
growth has been encouraged in legislation granting tax concessions to approved profit sharing and 
employee share ownership schemes. The legislation is pem1issive, in that it is designed to offer tax 
incentives which employers and employees can take up on a voluntary basis. 
Employers and employees can decide which scheme allows tilem to promote financial participation 
in the way best suited to tileir particular needs. The rules for the schemes have been updated in the 
light of experience. 
In the  1995  Finance Act significant changes w~re made to tile eligibility criteria for all five of tile 
United Kingdom tax-relieved employee financial participation schemes. The changes were intended 
to remove the previous restrictions on the inclusion of part-time employees from the schemes and 
to ensure that the tax reliefs give equal treatment to part-time employees, most Qf whom are 
women. The new rules ensure that part-time employees are - for tl1e  future - ~eligil!>le to  participate 
in those schemes. 
30 The 1996 Finance Act introduced a new Company Share Option Plan aimed at middle managers 
and those in middle and lower income ranges. It replaced the 1984 discretionary "executive share 
option scheme" which was designed for high earning executives and senior managers. At the same 
time, improvements were made to the other share incentive schemes to make them more flexible 
and attractive to· employers and employees alike. 
There are several types of statutory profit sharing, share ownership and share option schemes as 
well as many non-statutory schemes. 
Profit R.ela,ted Pay (PRP) schemes link a part of  employees' pay to changes in the profits of~ 
business they work for.  PRP paid to employees under a scheme which has been registcted by the 
Inland Revenue is eligible for tax relief up to a limit of 20 % of  pay or £4,000 , whichever is the 
lower. The costs of setting up a registered scheme are tax deductible. Separate schemes can be set 
up for any unit producing separate profit and loss accounts, but must cover 80% of  those employed 
in any unit covered by  PRP. All employees must benefit on similar terms. At 31  March  1996 there 
were approx.  12,800 registered PRP schemes covering almost 3.5  million employees. 
Approved employee share schemes provide significant advantages. They allow employees to 
receive shares free or at a reduced price from their employer without paying income tax on the 
value of  those shares. The costs a company incurs in setting up  approved schemes are also tax 
deductible. 
There are three types of approved share schemes. The first two provide that all employees of a 
company with over five years' service must be allowed to participate by the employer. The third 
scheme allows a company to restrict participation to selected employees. If the employer wishes, 
new employees or employees with fewer yea::;' service may be able to participate on similar terms .  . 
By the end of March  1994 about 3 million employees had benefited from all-employee profit 
sharing and share option schemes, receiving shares or options over shares initially worth some £14 
billion. 
In  addition to the all-employee schemes, the  Fin~ce Act 1984 introduced tax relief for approved 
discretionary share option schemes (also known as executive share option schemes). By the end of 
March 1995, 4469 discretionary share option schemes had been approved and were still being 
used. This tax relief was removed with effect from  July  1995 and replaced in the 1996 Finance Act 
by the Company Share Option Plan; 
ln addition to the statutory schemes described above, there are many profit-sharing and share 
option schemes in existence which are not approved.  ·  · 
Employee Share Ownership Trusts (ESOTs) provide a further means in which shares can be 
transferred to employees. There can be statutory or non-statutory ("case-la\v") ES.OPs.  Under the 
statutory scheme, companies set up a trust which acquires and distributes shares to employees. The 
trust is  responsible for buying and selling the shares and  for distributing them to employees, either 
directly or through an approved profit sharing scheme.  Since 1996, and ESOT may also be 
operated in conjunction with an approved savings-related share option scheme and so may grant 
employees options over shares and may distribute shares.to employees on their exercise of those 
options. Beneficiaries must include as a minimum all employees of the company and its 
subsidiaries who have been employed for five years or more. The Finance Act 1995. removed the 
requirement that employees must work twenty or more hours a week. 
Some companies prefer to  implement non-statutory or "case law"  ESOTS. While company 
31 contributions under such schemes may qualify as deductions for corporation tax purposes - if  the 
·contributions fulfil certain conditions - they do not attract all. the reliefs which are available to a 
statutory ESOT. Evidence suggests that "case law" ESOTS are much more numerous than statutory 
ESOTS. Jheir niles are negotiated with the tax inspector, giving employers the  flexi~ility to adapt 
schemes to the particular needs of  the company and its· employees. A significant development since 
1989 has been the growth of  the use of ESOTS in medium-scale privatisation. It has been 
estimated that there have been about forty of  these (see "Employee Share Ownership Plans", 
Incomes Data Services Ltd (IDS study 5(;8), December 1994).  · 
The information on the UK iQ the PEPPER table demonstrates that the growth of  financial 
participation has been impressive over the last decade or so. 
The UK Government supports a number of  initiatives to promote financial participation and is 
actively. involved in the dissemination of information and promotion of  good practice. 
In  1991, the Inland Revenue published a report which indicated thatthere was a need to increase 
awareness of  the ·tax incentives and benefits available for such schemes particularly amongst small 
firms and in the non-service sector, about the tax incentives and  ben~fits available for such 
schemes. Subsequently, the UK Government launched a campaign. The importance of this 
campaign is that financial participation is embedded in a total integrated approach to employee 
involvement. In addition to initiatives involving the Goveminent, a myriad of independent 
organisations and private companies provide information, advice, guidance, consultation, education 
·and research on financial participation schemes, as well as promotion and publicity. 
The UK has taken note of other experiences in the rest of the EU and beyond. 
The present arrangements in the UK appear to be successful in encouraging financiai  participation. 
There have been regular developments throughout the  1980's and  1990's in both the range of 
schemes available and the scope of  the tax incentives which accrue to them. The extensive 
programme of privatisation also has provided opportunities for employees to acquire a stake in the 
businesses they work for. 
32 ·ill  CONCLUSIONS 
Lqal structures and provisions for financ~al participation 
There has been no great change to government policy on PEPPER schemes in EU countries since 
the first PEPPER report was introduced in  1991, although the situation is improving slightly.  ·  ·.  · 
Official govem.Dlent positions in individual EU countries still range from those which are strongly 
or.partly in favour of  PEPPER, to those with no defined view. France and the UK have a long 
tradition in the encouragement of  financial participation and this also has been directed towards a 
variety of  schemes. In the period under consideration (1991-1995) these countries have made 
regular improvements in both the range of  schemes available and the scope of  the tax incentives 
which accrue to them. 
In other countries, such as Belgium, Denmark, Gennany, Greece, Spain, Italy,. Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Austria and Sweden, the governments discussed PEPPER but official government support 
has been limitedor lacking. Most of  these governments have held that these schemes are mainly 
the responsibility of  the social partners or the employer and employee-representatives in individual 
finns. However, we should note that very recently in Gennany, Spain and Italy there have been 
strong official appeals to the social partners to promote these schemes when in negotiation. Spain 
reports that during current negotiations the notion of taking account of productivity is a ne\v 
feature on the agenda. They expect a positive effect on productivity, wage flexibility, employment 
and employee involvement. In Italy, this has led to a .tripartite agreement in which the government 
says that they will introduce tax concessions. This has not yet been implemented. In Luxembourg, 
requests were made to the government by representatives of private sector employees and 
executives and the Liberal Party to further regulate participation in capital by means of share offers 
on preferential tenns. These proposals were strongly opposed by the two principal trade unions 
fearing an intervention in their  bargaining independence. This opposition is also found in other 
countries where PEPPER is less well developed:/ Belgium, Gennany, Spain and Italy, and also in 
the Netherlands.  ' 
In Belgium the government announced initiatives for legislation before the end of 1996, but 
previous proposals on profit sharing in  1993 did not reeeive any support.  · 
In Ireland, the Netherlands and Finland there appears to be a development towards increased 
government support for PEPPER. Very recently, in  1995, Ireland increased tax ince.ntives by five 
times the earlier amount and promoted the schemes iri a national Programme on employee 
involvement and productivity in co-operation with the social partners. In 1990, Finland introduced 
legislation on personnel funds  for profit sharing mainly directed towards share-ownership. The 
Finnish government made proposals in 1995 for further improvements. In 1994, the Netherlands 
introduced more detailed legislative procedures and improved incentives for profit sharing to 
stimulate employee capital accumulation related to wage saving systems. These countries have 
mentioned as their objectives greater employee involvement, productivity and competitiveness and 
wage flexibility on labour markets.  · 
The macro-economic situation has not affected government support and that of  the social partners 
for any proposals for financial participation. Recent debates relating to enhancing productivity and 
wage flexibility are also stimulating discussions on proposals. However, in mosttof the Member 
states trade unions can be expected to oppose the use of financial  participaliQI\~schemes to promote 
waac flexibility on labour markets. The perceived conflict between greater flcxibflity in labour 
tenns on the one han~ and the need for solidarity and greater involvement on the other hand 
33 might, sometimes,_hamper the introduction of  proposals for financial participation. 
With the exception of France and the UK, the legislation in the EC cau~tri~s only favours certain· 
schemes. The share-ownership is most favoured while cash-based profit sharing is least favoured.  . 
Most Member States have no restrictive regulations that might hamper the introduction of financial 
participation schemes. However, there are certain legislative requirements set out in Member States 
that concern eligibility for tax relief These refer~ for example, to a minimum percentage of  · 
personnel covered by the sCheme, eligibility criteria, retention periods and statutory and truStee .. , 
requirements, etc. 1Jtese requirements might requce. flexibility in introducing these schemes.  · 
However, in several cases the choices and options were improved. In other cases the possible 
administrative burden and/or set-up costs by the employer to meet the legislative requirements are 
deductible as operatio~al costs. 
An important improvement in the UK's 1995 legislation is the extension of eligibility to part-time 
employees. In France, too, improvements have been made to eligibility criteria. In some countries 
both in legislation and in practice eligibility criteria prevent the participation of  part-time 
employees and temporary employees on a short-term fixed contract. Further more, schemes are 
sometimes ·open only to personnel with a certain minimum length of  employment in the company. 
Privatisation 
Several countries reported .that the trend towards privatisation of public bodies bas given rise to 
greater interest in PEPPER schemes. In Portugal, specific legislation was developed in  1989 to 
provide for the issue of shares to.employees when their public organisation was privatised. The 
impact was a substantial increase in employee share-ownership. In  Denmark, privatisation appears 
to have led to remuneration systems that are more closely related to the performance of  the 
privatised firms and to possibilities to issue employee shares. In  Ireland, the adoption of  employee 
share ownership  schemes has received a greater degree of attention in view of the recent equity 
participation by employees in a few high-profile semi-State organisations. The acquisition of  shares 
by employees in Italy has been encouraged as public undertakings have been privatised. The same . 
can be seen in the UK and the Netherlands. This suggests.that governments can set up PEPPER 
schemes within this privatisation development, thus getting and gaining experience and creating 
awareness of  the possibilities of  these schemes for a wider audience. 
Incentives and tax provisions 
Most of the legislation on promoting financial participation schemes in Member States on PEPPER 
has to do with incentives such as fiscal or other financial advantages. In the period under 
consideration the main PEPPER countries, UK and France, have made further improvements in the 
variety of incentives for the different schemes. 
No specific inCentives for any scheme were found in Spain and Italy. Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland and Austria reported incentives only for share-ownership schemes and not for 
profit-sharing schemes: Incentives range from tax-free issue of shares or bonds to employees 
through tax  .. free amounts on distributed. profits, to more favourable tax arrangements: Other: 
advantages include exemption from social insurance contributions. In some c:Gdntrles these 
incentives are provided for both the employer and the employee and sometimes ·&ey allow 
employers to deduct the costs of  the scheme for tax purposes. 
34 Occasionally problems arise with social charges especially when some argue that the benefits 
should be regarded as normal wages subject to social charges while others argue that this type of 
remuneration should not be subjeet to these charges. For instance, in  Belgium~ these discussions 
hampe~  the development of  PEPPER schemes. 
The levels of  incentives are modest. However, there have been recent improvements in this respect · 
in Ireland (1995), the UK (1991) and France {1994). Other minor improvements in the period. : 
under consideration (1990-1995) were reported in Austria and the.Netherlands in 1994, and in the . 
1995-proposals in Finland. With the exception of  Austria, these improvements in the latter 
countries also concern a reduction in the retention periods. 
Other incentives are the possibility of  withdrawals before the end of  the retention period for 
specific expenses (new ~ousing, insurance and specific capital savings, retirement funds and in one 
case even cars (France) without any or only minor taxation on these withdrawals. 
Noteworthy incentives were found in France: In  1994, France introduced the concept of  a "time 
saviriss account" (compte d'epargne temps) allowing the allocation of  profit sharing bonuses 
(interessement) in the form of  paid time off, for a minimum period of  six months. Such schemes 
would enable employment. These examples of incentives illustrate that, at least for the countries 
with a well developed system for financial participation schemes, the policy on incentives and 
other financial advantages seems to have become an integral part of macro-economic policy in 
relation to wages and consumption.  · 
Diffusion of PEPPER 





decrease of profit-sharing 
modest, but relatively steady interest in employee share and bond 
schemes, there are no date on profit sharing 
slight increase in number of schemes and employees involved 
there are no data available 







increase of all schemes 
there are no data available; increase expected due to 1995  increase in 
tax relief 
expected inc;rease due to tripartite agreement and privatisation of public 
bodies  · 
increase of  cash-based profit-sharing 






increase under privatisation 
increase; expected further increase 
there is no data available 
substantial growth; doubling total number of schemes and employees 
involved. 
While there are substantial developments in the schemes and the number of  employees involved in 
countries with a longer tr.ldition on PEPPER, UK and France. other States with only a modest 
government palicy and legislative amngements experience a slight growth (Germany). a· steady 
situation (Denmark) or even a decline (Spain). In other countries where policy is being developed, 
there has already been an increase or one is expected (Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Italy). 
However, it appears that a growing disparity is developing between the acknowledge PEPPER 
countries and those countries that have less well-developed arrangements. 
Another observation is that with the exception of  the UK and France, most Member States do not 
have a clear view of the development, the possibilities, the experiences, or the problems of 
PEPPER schemes in their countries because no specific registration is provided nor any minor 
research done on these schemes. 
In considering the development of PEPPER in EO-countries so far, we can conclude that France 
and the UK have reached the level of an integrated legislation and a policy of a high level of 
distribution of  these schemes. Initially, a nationally supported, deferred profit-sharing scheme is the 
one that is supported most strongly. At a company level the most pronounced development arises 
from a nationally promoted company savings scheme. These observations suggest that countries 
might develop their scheme by introducing a modest deferred profit-ownership  and company 
savings system as a framework  for legislation and then carefully develop these further with the 
integration of cash-based profit-sharing on the one hand and employee share-ownership on the 
other, gradually improving the offered incentives; The beneficial tax treatment in these schemes 
has without any doubt contributed to the spread of financial  participation in the Member States. 
This development might be stimulated through an environment in which profit-sharing is 
considered as a voluntary and motivating instrument separated from  wage negotiations leaving 
bargaining independence to the social partners. Also, given the positive relationship between the 
schemes' occurrences in the individual companies the development path suggested above might 
lead tQ  in a situation in which PEPPER schemes became more independent later on. 
Encouragement 
-
Only a few countries encourage the use of such schemes by making sure that adequate information. 
is available to all parties. Active campaigns for the. promotion of PEPPER  schemes are found in 
France, the UK, Finland, the Netherlands and Ireland. The information provided in the UK and 
France is impressive and exemplary. In this respect. the other countries see it as the responsibility 
of  employers and their representatives. Only Germany and Austria reported that the employers 
organizations in the respective countries have set up campaigns for specific  information~ Austria is 
an interesting ease because the ·Chamber of Labour has initiated different actions :to  promote 
PEPPER both to employers and employees. They have also developed training-:programmes. 
.  ..· 
Most countries that adopt a more developed policy to promote PEPPER  are aware of  the possible 
36 arguments against it and are taking initiatives to conv.incc the social partners of  the positive effects: 
It is to be noted, however, that on occasions companies issue shares to their employees when the 
-company has economic and financial problems. This carries great risks for employees and has le4. 
to scepticism on the part of the parties eoncerned. However in the best schemes, these risks can be. 
avoided. Moreover, the amounts involved et consequent risks arc generally more modest  .. 
Other criticism on PEPPER was also the subject of regulation in several occasions. For example,  . 
the UK legislation on statutory ESOTs was designed to avoid the criticisms levelled·against ESOTs 
in the United States, where, for instance, ESOTs arc often used as a substitute for employee · 
retirement benefits or as a "poison pill" protection against take-overs, rather than as a mechanism 
. to encourage -individual employee share ownership.  · 
An interesting observation from the UK and Ireland is the integration of  the promotion of  PEPPER 
schemes with the promotion of employee involvement in general to unleash the pr<>4uctive power 
of  the workforce and to improve competitiveness and quality of production. Italy also refers to this 
movement in the tripartite agreement between the government and the social partners. In France, a 
specific National Council promotes PEPPER in the general context of  the employee involvement 
trend. This suggests that in line with the Council Recommendation Member States should develop 
a National Programme and/or National Institutional Bodies to develop systems for promoting 
PEPPER within the national cOntext and particularly  in relationship with the general employee 
involvement trend. 
Exchange of experiences between Member States 
In France, the latest PEPPER-Recommendations were considered along with the latest changes in 
the legislation of 1994. Some countries report that it learns from experiences of  good (and bad) 
practices in other European countries and elsewhere. Other countries point to possible risks of 
placing too much emphasis on experiences from other Member States for the learning process in 
their country. This is due to varying industrial relations systems and legislation between Member 
States.  There does not appear to  be any regular exchange of information between Member States 
either on legislation or good practices. However, countries that have recently begun developing the 
scheme refer to other countries, for example Ireland refers to the French experiences and Finland 
to experiences in both France and Sweden. This observation suggest that an exc~ge  of  good 
practices between the respective parties from the different  Member States might clear some of the 
problems of implementing PEPPER. It might also help the parties concerned to deal with the  · 
arguments against PEPPER and show them how these arguments can be resolved within the 
context of  the schemes. 
Another important aspect of  the promotion of PEPPER is, what in the earlier PEPPER report they 
called the intra-community dimension: e.g. what obstacles are encountered by practising a Pepper 
scheme in country A. and what solutions can be .offered to companies practising such a scheme? 
Companies referred to here are those that have establishments in another EU country and which 
want to make the benefits available to their. employees in the other EU country. The earlier report 
did not deal witl1  these and similar questions. In  France, it is noted that the authorities would 
welcome EU-actions favouring group-level agreements (i.e. PEPPER schemes for a group of 
companies within one enterprise) on a European level. Italy also made similar appeals. 
This suggests that they also want to promote the exchange of information on different legislative 
rules and procedures promoting and monitoring PEPPER schemes. This could . seive to support the 
distribution of  many options on PEPPER in the Member States. 
37 Ava~lable  op~ions to parties concerned 
As has been put forward earlier, most governments. have held that .PEPPER schemes are mainly the 
responsibility of  the social partners C?r the employer and employee-representatives in the individuat · 
firms. This- means that any legislation or other  .regulations will provide a framework' within the  . 
details can be negotiated. However, in .the case of  tax-incentives, regulations might limit the  · 
available options; Of  course, any legislation will set a limit to the variety of  options available. In 
cases where there are elaborate legislative procedures like the UK, there is a need to provide for 
specific individual arrangements. In the UK for instance there are "case law"· ESOTs that allow 
part of  the tax reliefs ev~n though these schemes do .not fully. mee~  the gene~  requirements.- This  . 
tax reliefs can be allowed in negotiations between company or trustees and tax inspectors~  ·Again in 
· the UK there are many non statutory schemes, reflectfug the non-prescriptive nature of  the UK 
approach. However, it should also be noted that these schemes run in parallel to statutory schemes. 
This positive. relationship probably derives from a general positive attitude in the UK towards 
PEPPER schemes. In another case, the Netherlands, this possibility of  tax negotiations became 
limited· with the introduction of  the central law on wage savings and employee capital 
accumulation in 1994. It should be noted that in most countries and for most schemes participation 
is voluntary.  France is the only country where deferred profit-sharing is compulsory for companies 
of a certain size. 
There is also a need to reach a balance between general collective rules and provisions in cases 
where the possibility for PEPPER schemes, especially profit-sharing schemes, are based on 
collective agreements (Germany, Spain and in Italy). In these countries the government took 
initiatives to create negotiation space and enhance the choices made within the conte>..'t of collective 
agreements. For instance in Italy, this was laid down in an agreement with social partners. The 
Italian government notes, that this agreement made it possible to avoid the main obstacle to greater 
use in Italy of  schemes to promote employee participation in a company's profits and results, i.e. 
the rigid wage-setting system, which gives businesses little scope for raising employee 
remuneration above the increases established by collective agreements. 
These initiatives are also related to the government appeal to social partners mentioned above in 
other Member State to promote these schemes in practice. In these countries they were taken··. 
initiatives to open up the possibilities for PEPPER In Denmark, Greece, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands options and choices within the context of  the law are for the individual employer and 
might be subject to negotiati9ns at company level. They 3!f: therefore less a subject for agreement 
on a collective level. 
If should be noted however that experiences in the past have shown that, in general, dissemination 
of  the schemes could be improved when schemes are developed at a higher level, e.g. the social 
partners at a sector level. Schemes can then be applied at an individual company level, with clearly 
defined rules for indivi_dual employees at that level. This suggest that the recent appeal to the 
social partners in  Germany, Spain and Italy, should be supported. The German g()vemment reports 
the need for new initiatives from the social partners, in order to create an environment for private 
employee investments to enhance employment growth, and to encourage employee participation in 
capital and also to improve employee involvement in enterprise. 
Good practices as mentioned in the Annex to the Recommendation, concerning conditions for the 
introduction of schemes and other recommendations, are found in the UK and  France. Finland and 
Austria are also interesting in this respect. When schemes are introduced, the  l~r  c:Ountries have 
legislative provisions with regard  to informing and consulting the respective,.parties and individual 
employees concerned. In Austria a collective institution made up of both representative parties is 
promoting the PEPPER schemes and provides for consulting and for training  ~ctivities. In Greece, 
3R comp~ies adopting cash-based profit-sharing have an o'bligation to draw up a list enumerating .the 
beneficiaries, and the amounts granted to each individual employee, a copy of  which must be sent 
to the workers' council. 
Enhancement of mana&ement and labour's awarene5s 
In the UK and France activities concerning the enhancement of  management and labour's 
awareness are almost institutionally embedded into different public and private bodies: These 
bodies provide for specific infonnation campaigns and consulting practices directed to both. 
employ~rs and employees. We have already mentioned the official appeal to social partners in 
Gennany, Spain and Italy. In Ireland, they launched a specific National Programme. Again Austria 
is an interesting case. There. representative parties have developed a learning programme which is 
included in the training for works councils and employers. 
Ideas for the reinforcement of PEPPER 
In the framework of  their respective competence the following ideas for the reinforcement of 
PEPPER could be explored further by Member States, Social partners,  and in matters of  exchange· 
of information and good practices by the Commission: 
Develop a framework law 
The analysis of PEPPER schemes in practice in  EU countries suggests that there are not many 
legal obstacles to their introduction. However, certain modifications of existing laws, and the 
adoption of a framework law by  Member States could be·useful to integrate the regulations for all 
possible PEPPER schemes. 
Clarify the distinction between wages subject to social charges and the advantages derived from 
PEPPER schemes  '· 
Next to fiscal advantages most PEPPER schemes also provide exemption from certain costs and 
charges. Occasionally financial advantages such as the issue of shares or bonds at a price lower 
than the market price is regarded as income or wages that are subject to social charges. In some 
case these interpretations by the tax authorities are heavily debated and taken to court. Sometimes 
leeislation has improved the matter but in other cases discussions are still going on. A clear legal 
distinction would be highly beneficial. 
Enhancement of  eligibility 
Although most of the existing arrangements do not discriminate between categories of benefici-
aries, this, however, does not mean that there is equal participation. In some countries, both in 
legislation and in practice, eligibility criteria still prevent the participation of part-time employees 
and temporary employees on a short-tenn fixed contract ; in addition schemes are usually eligible 
only to personnel with a certain minimum length of  employment in the company. The eligibility 
for PEPPER schemes should be improved.  · 
National wage saving system as a vehicle for share-ownership and profit-shq.ring• 
Nationally supported deferred profit-sharing schemes are most likely initially to promote the 
39 development of.PEPPER. This suggests that countries might develop their schemes by introducing 
modest deferred profit-sharing and a company savings system as a framework for legislation, They 
might then carefully develop these further with the integration of  cash-based· profit-sharing o~  the · 
one hand and employee sbare~wnership on the other. In so doing they gradually improve the· ·. 
incentives offered. This might also end in a situation in which PEPPER schemes become. more. 
self-sustaining later on. 
Provide for a stimulating climate 
The development of PEPPER will be stimulated through an environment in which profit-sharing is. 
considered as a· voluntaly and motivating i..nrument, in most cases separated from wage  · 
negotiations and .leaving bargaining independence to the social partners. The establishment of 
National Institutional Bodies that develops systems for promoting PEPPER iri the national context 
could also stimulate developments in Member .$tatcs~  · 
Set up PEPPER schemes in the course ofprivatisation of  public bodies· 
Many countries reported the trend towards privatisation of public bodies as a possible vehicle for 
g~  interest in PEPPER schemes. This suggests that govern.ments cart set up PEPPER schemes 
during this privatisation process thus gaining experience. and creating awareness of  the possibilities 
of  these schemes among a wider audience. 
Integrate PEPPER schemes into programmes on employee-involvement 
It is interesting to note that sometimes the integration of the promotion of  the PEPPER schemes is 
linked with promotion of  employee involvement to unleash the productive power of  the workforce 
and to improve competitiveness and quality of  production. In line with the Council 
Recommendation this suggests that Member States should develop national or sectoral programmes 
that develop systems for promoting PEPPER in the national context in relationship with the general 
trend towards employee involvement. 
Make an appeal to the social partners 
Occasionally PEPPER schemes ·can be ·promqted by the intrOduction of  provisions in collective 
agreements. Sometimes,· in recent discussions during die development of  collective agreements, 
some o{the social partners have sought to place PEPPER on the agenda. An official appeal to the 
social partners to promote these schemes during their negotiations, making reference to the 
expected positive effects of  the schemes on productivity, wage flexibility, employment and 
employee involvement could probably reinforce the process towards a higher acceptance of 
PEPPER. 
Avoid irresponsible risks for employees 
Occasionally companies in Member States issue shares to their employees when the company has 
economic and financial problems. Without sufficient information this carries great risks for 
employees and leads to scepticism on the part of  the parties concerned. 
Tackle  the problems for intra-EU schemes involving subsidiaries in dijforent national circum-
stances 
40' ·Another very important aspect of the promotion of PEPPER is the intra-EU dimension of  the 
application of  schemes to subsidiaries of  a company in different Member States. These 
international companies face obstacles when they make benefits available to their employees in 
their subsidiaries in other EU countries. This also suggests the promotion of  exchange of 
infoanation about differeitt legislative rules and procedures for promoting and moni.tQring  PEPPER 
schemes tO support the widening of  many options On· PEPPER options in the Member States.  .  . 
without attempting to haanonise approaches across Europe. since legal frameworlcs and practices 
vary greatly across the Member States.  · 
Pro~ote the development of  clear and Understandable  models and plans for introduction 
Given the importance of  these schemes for productivity. wage flexibility, employment and 
empioyec involvement, it is quite disappointing that the usc of.thesc schemes in most Member 
States is so low. This is partly because the social parties often have a poor understanding of  these 
matters. It is also related· to the fiscal and legal complexity of  the schemes. It appears that schemes 
arc mostly designed by fiscal and legal experts. Clear models and plans for the introduction of 
schemes that arc manageable and understandable both by management and labour could be helpful 
to avoid the myth of  the complex and. expert character of PEPPER schemes. 
Stimulate information exchange between Member States 
The situation in Europe regarding the application of PEPPER schemes has slightly improved. How-
ever, a growing disparity appears to be developing  bern_ree~ the acknowledged PEPPER countries 
and the countries that have only· modest policy and minor arrangements. There seems to be no 
exchange of infonnation between Member States regularly either on legislation or good practices. 
Demonstration projects on good practices with a view to promoting the exchange of  infonnation in 
workshops, conferences, and through other means should be developed. These can be directed 
towards the social partners as they have a decisive influence on the acceptance of similar schemes. · 
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